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Human security and the stabilization mandate of MINUSCA 
 
Alexander Gilder 
Royal Holloway, University of London, UK 
 
Abstract 
This article looks narrowly at whether a ‘human security’ approach can be seen in a UN peace operation 
that pursues stabilization, namely the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The UN’s interpretation of stabilization has not 
been expressly set out, but stabilization missions typically work alongside the host state to extend state 
authority and use robust force to counter spoilers. Human security is a concept which is rights-based, 
promotes the ‘vital core’, has a concern for vulnerability, utilises preventative protection methods, and 
empowers local persons to have agency in the peace process. Attempts have been made to 
institutionalise and mainstream human security practices within the UN. An analytical framework of 
human security is outlined in this article and used to assess to what extent the mandate of MINUSCA 
pursues human security-based goals. An extensive review of UN documentation looks at the mandate 
and practice of MINUSCA and it is argued that the mission does seek to empower local people, engage 
in a bottom-up manner and entrench the rule of law. The analytical framework also casts light on aspects 









Over the past two decades there have been numerous attempts to institutionalise the concept of ‘human 
security’ at the United Nations (UN).1 During a similar period, UN peace operations have evolved into 
a new beast, one which holds the protection of civilians and sustainable, inclusive peace as paramount 
priorities. More recently though, the Security Council has further developed a new priority – 
stabilization. Stabilization has not been defined by the UN nor has it been consistently expounded in 
mission mandates.2 In 2015 the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) stated the 
                                                 
1 For instance, the UN Human Security Unit was created in 2004 with the purpose of mainstreaming human 
security in all UN activities. Also, the UN General Assembly has held thematic debates on the topic and 
adopted a definition of human security in 2012. See UN, A/RES/66/290 (2012); Thérien, “Human Security: 
The Making of a UN Ideology.” 
2 High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace; Aditi Gorur, 
“Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions.” 
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term has a wide range of interpretations and the UN’s usage needs clarification.3 The adoption of 
stabilization has been said to be a ‘hodge-podge’ of words and “[t]he danger is that the terminological 
imprecision surrounding ‘stabilization’ creates a meta-category; full of buzzwords but empty of 
meaning.”4 Generally speaking, UN stabilization missions typically do two things. First, they displace 
and deter armed groups and, second, undertake peacebuilding activities to entrench state authority and 
create state legitimacy in the power vacuum left behind.5 Both of these actions are intended to extend 
state authority, with the displacement of armed groups achieved through the ‘robust’ use of force by 
UN troops followed by civilian-led peacebuilding activities.6  
The question this article seeks to answer is, to what extent does the stabilization mandate of the 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA) resemble a human security-based strategy? Without a clear definition it is important to 
ascertain what underpins the UN’s approach to stabilization. It may be the case that practices used in a 
stabilization mission are in fact akin to human security. Human security is an important concept for UN 
peace operations generally since it seeks to understand the context and nuances of a conflict from the 
bottom-up which is essential for the effectiveness of a mission.7 There are also temporal reasons for 
this choice as the development of the concept of human security is temporally aligned with the 
emergence of peace operations with complex multidimensional activities and the inclusion of protection 
of civilian (PoC) mandates in the early 2000s.8 More recently, stabilization has begun to take a more 
‘robust’ approach to PoC which may indicate a commitment to human security. This paper argues the 
human security concept is based upon five principles; (1) human rights and the rule of law, (2) a focus 
on the vital core identified in a bottom-up manner, (3) a concern for vulnerability and building 
resilience, (4) preventative protection, and (5) the empowerment of people to act on their own behalf 
and implement solutions to security threats.  
The five principles serve as an analytical framework to be used in the discursive analysis of 
MINUSCA’s mandate and accompanying reporting to demonstrate how the UN frames its activities. 
This analytical framework can serve as a tool to deepen our understanding of mission mandates and 
explores potential linkages of contemporary peacekeeping practice with the broad goals advanced by 
human security. The study is based on an extensive review of public UN documentation and therefore 
                                                 
3 High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace, para 114. 
4 Mac Ginty, “Against Stabilization,” 24. 
5 See e.g. Gilder, “The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace Operations”; Tull, 
“The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement”; de Coning et al., “Towards a United 
Nations stabilization doctrine - stabilization as an emerging UN practice”. 
6 There are a number of recent discussions surrounding the increased use of force by UN peacekeepers to 
combat terrorism and what robustness means in practice. See e.g. Karlsrud, The UN at War; de Coning, “Is 
stabilization the new normal?”; Karlsrud, “From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and 
Counterterrorism”; Kjeksrud et al., “Protecting governments from insurgencies”. 
7 For a discussion of the importance of context see Hanlon and Christie, Freedom from Fear, Freedom from 
Want, 32-3. 
8 Fortier, “The Evolution of Peacekeeping”; Golberg and Hubert, “The Security Council and the Protection of 
Civilians”. 
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cannot paint the full picture of how the mandate is interpreted and operationalised in practice. Future 
research could build on the application of this framework to further assess whether the UN is in fact 
pursuing a human security-based agenda in the field. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learnt from 
how activities are framed in Security Council meetings and Secretary-General reporting, for instance, 
and whether they embody the operationalisation of human security. The article more generally 
contributes to the literature on human security because few other attempts have been made to assess the 
implementation of the concept. It is argued that MINUSCA does seek to achieve some of human 
security’s goals under the guise of the UN’s peacebuilding agenda, such as empowering local people, 
engaging in a bottom-up manner and entrenching the rule of law. The analytical framework also casts 
light on aspects of the stabilization mandate which are problematic for peacebuilding such as 
militarisation and UN cooperation with the host state.  
 
2 The principles of human security 
 
The concept of human security seeks to shift the referent object of security from the state to the 
individual by challenging realist views and giving the individual intrinsic value. Where the individual’s 
interests compete with that of the state or society, the former should be given priority. The UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) coined the term in their 1994 Human Development Report building 
on the earlier goal of achieving freedom from fear and want found in the Preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The Report attempted to create a vision of human security that could be 
adopted by states and the UN in furthering social development.9 The team behind the Report sought to 
create an approach that focused on issues such as poverty, disease, threats of violent conflict, and 
restrictions on political freedom.10 Following the 1994 UNDP Report various middle powers including 
Canada, Norway and Japan adopted human security approaches in their foreign policies.11 In 2001 the 
Commission on Human Security was created by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and published its 
Human Security Now Report two years later.12 The Commission defined human security as: 
to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms 
and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms— 
freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical 
(severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes 
that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, 
environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people 
the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.13 
                                                 
9 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, 24. 
10 Acharya, “Human Security,” 449. 
11 Farer, “Defining the Elephant and Imagining Its Tasks,” 46. 
12 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now. 
13 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 4. 
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The definition places a focus on pervasive and widespread threats in an attempt to narrow 
human security to the core threats to survival and make the concept more practical for 
operationalisation.14 The principles expounded below are based upon the Commission’s modelling of 
human security and draw out five core elements of what human security includes.  
Paris has argued that human security is a concept which is not useful for policymaking because 
its competing policy goals are too difficult to reconcile and a further author stated it “has so far proven 
largely unworkable in practice.”15 However, the Commission on Human Security took a distinct focus 
on humanitarian crisis and conflict alongside emphasising that the methods advanced by human security 
respect and simply put into practice existing international legal norms such as those within international 
human rights and humanitarian law. For instance, the Commission argues a rights-based human security 
approach “reorients humanitarian strategies towards enhancing people’s capabilities, choices and 
security.”16 The Commission sought to present human security as a tool with which to guide activities 
during and after conflict. Concurrently, UN peace operations have developed in the 21st century to 
include a range of peacebuilding activities which support the development of both the state as a whole 
and communities at the local level. Peace operations engage with communities on a daily basis and are 
mandated to support elections, address sexual violence, support refugees and internally displaced 
persons with reintegration into local communities, and undertake a range of projects aimed at improving 
local services and rebuilding the capacity of local, regional, and national government bodies to carry 
out necessary functions of the state. The literature on human security is rich and definitions are abound 
which cannot be engaged with in the space allotted here. Consequently, an analytical framework based 
upon the Commission’s Human Security Now Report sufficiently narrows the scope of the study but 
has been chosen because the Report aligns temporally, was commissioned by the Secretary-General, 
and shares with UN peace operations a focus on humanitarian crisis and conflict.  
 
2.1 Human rights and the rule of law 
 
It is accepted that the rule of law, respect for international legal norms such as those within human 
rights and humanitarian law, accountability through the law, and good governance are inherent to 
human security.17 The Commission on Human Security, when discussing the importance of existing 
international law, made the rights-based character of human security clear.18 International law in general 
“must be at the heart of human security” and the latter is constructed from the fragmented disciplines 
                                                 
14 Alkire, “A Vital Core that Must Be Treated with the Same Gravitas as Traditional Security Threats,” 360. 
15 Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” 88; Chappuis, “Human Security and Security Sector 
Reform,” 99. 
16 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 27. 
17 Daft, The Relationship Between Human Security Discourse and International Law, 5. 
18 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 28. 
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of human rights law, humanitarian law, international criminal law, and refugee law.19 International law 
serves as a basic criteria with which to strengthen work on human security’s objectives.20 
 The Human Security Now Report has a focus on protecting people in violent conflict where the 
authors say that “[p]rotecting human rights and upholding humanitarian law are essential to human 
security in conflict situations.”21 The Commission explains human security can be used to identify the 
rights at stake in a particular situation which demonstrates how the former can enrich existing normative 
rights.22 For example, using human security’s other principles it can be assessed which rights are most 
threatened and empowerment strategies can be used to build the capacity of those affected to be resilient 
to security threats. The report argues for integrated strategies that protect people and are mutually 
reinforcing with specific attention for vulnerable groups that require protection.23 At the core of this 
protection is promoting respect for the rule of law.24 When the international community undertakes 
actions aimed at protecting rights and promoting the rule of law, like by deploying a UN peace 
operation, it does so under existing normative frameworks.25 By grounding human security in those 
norms human security can be utilised to give a universal, coherent framework that focuses the attention 
of existing law on protecting individuals from immediate and pervasive threats identified by those 
affected. The threats concerned are identified by the vital core, discussed next. 
 
2.2 The vital core 
 
The Commission knew that it would be impossible and wholly impracticable for actors to look at all 
possible security issues relating to all individuals and groups, therefore a solution was needed.26 The 
solution was the creation of a variable ‘vital core’ which is described as what people hold to be the 
‘essence of life’ and ‘crucially important’.27 The vital core is able to shift the focus on a needs basis for 
different individuals and groups. 
 The Commission’s definition of human security includes the protection from “critical (severe) 
and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations”.28 There is not an exact definition of what can 
constitute a critical threat to avoid top-down decisions on which considerations are most critical to the 
essence of life for all people.29 Instead, the vital core can vary depending on the individuals and groups 
affected, to take into consideration what they believe to be the essence of their lives be it a political, 
                                                 
19 Chinkin et al., International Law and New Wars, 565. 
20 Hanlon and Christie, Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Want, 55. 
21 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 28. 
22 ibid. 10. 
23 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 134. 
24 ibid. 134. 
25 See e.g. UN, ST/SGB/1999/13 (1999); UN, A/68/19 (2014), para. 212; UN, A/46/185 (1991), para 28. 
26 Ogata, “From State Security to Human Security,” 4. 
27 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 4. 
28 ibid. 4 
29 Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security,” 9. 
The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in International 
Peacekeeping http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13533312.2020.1733423 
economic, environmental or another issue. In this way security is personalised and not rigid based on 
what the international community, and consequently states, determine to be the most critical and 
pervasive threats. 
When applying human security as an analytical framework the vital core is interpreted as 
whether or not the actors seeking to provide security have sought to consult individuals concerned on 
what they hold to be ‘crucially important’ for security and well-being. Hanlon and Christie have made 
similar observations explaining “insights from grassroots civil society organizations must reach the 
desks of top-down development planners. Only through continuous stakeholder dialogue involving a 
range of both local and international actors can peacebuilding achieve meaningful results” that provide 
positive human security improvements.30 The concept of human security does not have a predetermined 
hierarchy of threats. Rather than having a predetermined hierarchy dictated by the international 
community on what is seen as the most effective course of action for the globe, the international 
community instead considers the most prevalent needs of individuals and communities in each 
threatened location. For instance, a predetermined hierarchy could suggest a threat to political security 
is the second most important after the threat of violence from armed groups but for many communities 
food scarcity or infant mortality could be much more prevalent concerns than physical violence.  
The vital core and human security’s lack of a predetermined hierarchy of threats is part of what 
gives human security its exclusive character. By adopting a framework that requires international actors 
to seek views of individuals and groups on what those people feel are the key factors undermining 
security the international actor concerned can provide a response which will lead to meaningful 
improvements. That is to say, the effectiveness of interventions will be enhanced and more able to 




Human security recognises vulnerability as a crucial factor in decision-making. The Commission 
expressly calls for concern for people on the move and for women, children, the elderly, the disabled, 
the indigenous, and the missing. In addition, the UN General Assembly, when defining human security, 
declared that “[a]ll individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and 
freedom from want”.31 Due to the attention given to vulnerability by the human security discourse it 
necessarily forms one of the principles of the concept for the analytical framework. 
There is a rich body of work on vulnerability and notably the work of Fineman has argued that 
identifying specific vulnerabilities can be stigmatising.32 For the purposes of this work it is simply 
suggested that some individuals or groups are more vulnerable than others and should be identified by 
                                                 
30 Hanlon and Christie, Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Want, 107. 
31 UN, A/RES/66/290 (2012), para. 3(a) (emphasis added). 
32 Fineman, “Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth,” 315 
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international actors. For instance, Tobin suggests that the fact all humans are in some way vulnerable 
should not obscure that some are more vulnerable than others due to many different factors.33 For the 
application of this analytical framework, there needs to be clear identification of particular 
vulnerabilities. A human security approach could be evident if categories of persons are identified as 
being at particular risk.  
Fineman argues that the partial antidote to vulnerability is resilience which is defined as “what 
provides an individual with the means and ability to recover from harm or setbacks.”34 The ability to be 
resilient and build further resilience is determined by the level of resources a person has access to. The 
actions taken by an international actor must contribute to building resilience to evidence a concern for 
human security, as opposed to identifying a vulnerability and taking short-term action which leaves the 
root cause of the vulnerability intact. 
 
2.4 Protection and empowerment 
 
The principles of protection and empowerment form one overarching and interlinked strategy. First, it 
is recognised that people require protection from a range of threats, not only physical harm, and 
responses must be preventative where possible with a long-term vision in mind. Second, empowerment 
strategies must ensure institutions, communities, and individuals are resilient and able to identify and 
address security threats locally where possible and be given a voice at regional, national and 
international levels to raise security issues. 
The Human Security Now Report states, 
To protect people—the first key to human security—their basic rights and freedoms 
must be upheld. To do so requires concerted efforts to develop national and 
international norms, processes and institutions, which must address insecurities in 
ways that are systematic not makeshift, comprehensive not compartmentalized, 
preventive not reactive. Human security helps identify gaps in the infrastructure of 
protection as well as ways to strengthen or improve it.35 
The protection element means that an intervention should, where possible, be preventative and not 
simply fight fires and respond after, for example, an attack on a town by an armed group, but instead 
will take the initiative to ensure the security of individuals from known threats before catastrophe 
strikes. Interventions such as the deployment of a peace operation is a top-down action and what the 
international community feels is needed to ‘shield people’ and create structures that ensure the rule of 
law and democratic engagement.36 However, under a human security approach protection cannot be 
merely from threats of physical violence and broader considerations are needed including for instance, 
                                                 
33 Tobin, “Understanding Children’s Rights,” 164. 
34 Fineman, “Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth,” 320. 
35 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 11. 
36 Ogata, “The Human Security Commission’s strategy,” 25-6. 
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health crises, water shortages, financial crisis or pollution.37 Many threats to human security that require 
protection will stem from conflict but not all will, and the international community cannot only see 
protection as ensuring physical integrity when utilising a human security approach. 
The empowerment aspect of the Commission’s framework is thought to have the most potential 
and is argued to show how human security can respond to crises in a more legitimate and focused way 
than existing security practices.38 Empowerment is, “[p]eople’s ability to act on their own behalf—and 
on behalf of others…”39 Where people require protection, or have been protected, they can identify and 
implement solutions to security threats.40 To do so requires resilience where people empowered can 
“create new opportunities for work and address many problems locally. And they can mobilize for the 
security of others—say, by publicizing food shortages early, preventing famines or protesting human 
rights violations by states.”41 
It is through bottom-up engagement where individuals in society are able to identify and 
communicate their needs to a range of actors. Where people are adequately protected, they can be 
empowered to “make better choices, and actively prevent and mitigate the impact of insecurities.”42 The 
two strands of protection and empowerment are core to human security’s novelty. They are mutually 
reinforcing where “[p]eople protected can exercise many choices. And people empowered can avoid 
some risks and demand improvements in the system of protection.”43 A human security approach by 
the UN requires the facilitation of empowerment particularly where individuals have been forced to 
build their own security regimes within communities because the state is unwilling or unable to provide 
security.44 A UN peace operation that is utilising elements of a human security approach will ensure 
protection from more than only threats of violent conflict and first and foremost take preventative steps 
to address a range of security issues. In addition, empowerment will be facilitated by creating space for 
local people to identify the causes of insecurity, implement strategies to counter those causes, and leave 
behind people who can bring about change in their own societies when insecurity arises. 
 
3 Human security in MINUSCA 
 
3.1 Human rights and the rule of law 
 
MINUSCA’s first mandate in April 2014 included a host of rights and norms-based provisions. The 
mandate stresses the need to end impunity for violations of international law either within the national 
                                                 
37 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 11.  
38 Ogata, “From State Security to Human Security,” 5. 
39 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 11. 
40 ibid. 6. 
41 ibid. 11. 
42 Ogata, “The Human Security Commission’s strategy,” 26. 
43 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 12. 
44 Hanlon and Christie, Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Want, 62 
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legal system or before the International Criminal Court.45 To assist the transitional authorities in that 
endeavour, MINUSCA was to monitor and report on violations of humanitarian law and human rights 
and to work on preventing future violations by utilising human rights observers.46 Furthermore, ending 
impunity would be particularly difficult where the ex-Séléka are in control of government functions. 
MINUSCA was mandated to extend state authority and to build the capacity of the judicial system and 
reinstate the criminal justice system “within the framework of the United Nations global focal point on 
rule of law”.47 From the mission’s inception there was an understanding that for an effective state the 
rule of law needed to be re-established. Since 2014 the mission has worked on the reform of the police 
and gendarmerie in compliance with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) and 
expanded its monitoring of violations to specifically focus on children and women in light of the sexual 
violence that has taken place throughout the Central African Republic (CAR).48 
 To re-establish the rule of law MINUSCA sought to support the reopening of courts, prisons, 
police stations, and related infrastructure.49 The mission would provide a secure environment for the 
operation of the criminal justice system to end impunity and ensure adherence to human rights law.50 
This formed part of an overarching strategy for MINUSCA, and is seen to be vital to the success of the 
mission, where it was believed a) international forces would be more effective if the penal system was 
re-established and b) there must be development and respect of human rights and the rule of law if the 
CAR is to have peace.51 The CAR’s legal system has been said to be ‘dysfunctional’ with a severe lack 
of resources.52 To rectify this, MINUSCA was granted urgent temporary measures under its mandate 
“to maintain basic law and order and fight impunity”.53 These temporary measures are beyond the 
normal law enforcement capabilities of peace operations and are created without establishing 
precedent.54 In 2019 it was reported that the temporary measures were used to apprehend 54 persons on 
suspicion of crimes such as murder, kidnap, armed robbery, and torture.55  
MINUSCA first deployed a team of investigation and prosecution experts to assist with 
investigations of serious violations of international law.56 At a later date, international prosecutors, 
judges and national magistrates would try the alleged perpetrators of violations.57 The resulting body to 
hold these trials is the Special Criminal Court mandated under MINUSCA’s temporary measures in 
                                                 
45 UN, S/RES/2149 (2014), 2, para 12. 
46 ibid. para 30(e)(i) 
47 ibid. para 30(f)(ii), 30(f)(iii). 
48 UN, S/PV.7734 (2016), 3 as per Mr. Ladsous; UN, S/RES/2387 (2017), para 43(d)(ii). 
49 UN, S/2014/142 (2014), para 76. 
50 ibid. para 81; UN, S/RES/2387 (2017), para 43(e)(vi). 
51 UN, S/2016/565 (2016), paras 46-9; UN, S/PV.7206 (2014), 3 as per Mr. Gaye; UN, S/2014/142 (2014), para 
10. 
52 UN, S/2014/928 (2014), para 56. 
53 UN, S/RES/2149 (2014), para 40; UN, S/RES/2301 (2016), para 34(d)(i). 
54 UN, S/RES/2301 (2016), para 34(d)(i). 
55 UN, S/2019/147 (2019), para 46. 
56 UN, S/2014/562 (2014), para 53. 
57 ibid. para 54. 
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agreement with the Transitional Authorities.58 The Special Criminal Court has been criticised by the 
Russian delegation as having potential for extreme costs and inefficiency.59 Progress was slow, despite 
its inception in August 2014 it was not until June 2017 that a Special Prosecutor and five judges were 
sworn in and until May 2018 for rules of procedure and evidence for the Court to be adopted.60 The 
Court’s first session was held in October 2018 and the first investigations supported by MINUSCA 
were launched in 2019.61 By October 2019 the Court had identified 22 priority cases and MINUSCA 
had created a ‘special legal corps’ to “protect the rights of the accused.”62 What is notable though is that 
the mandate for providing support to the Court has been greatly shortened in the most recent iteration 
of MINUSCA’s mandate.63 This may indicate that now the Court has been established it will develop 
further independence from the UN. Ending impunity through a court such as this is a way in which the 
Security Council can link the work of peace operations to wider agendas on international criminal 
justice and universal human rights.  
In less than one year from the mission’s deployment, courts in Bangui resumed their functions 
and magistrates were deployed to 12 out of 28 courts in other areas of the CAR.64 By 2017, civil cases 
were being adjudicated by mobile courts supported by MINUSCA and UNDP and criminal cases were 
being heard in Bangui.65 Prisons were reopened and MINUSCA was granted a number of corrections 
officers as part of its troop ceiling to assist with the training of CAR prison officers and improving 
prison standards.66 
Despite MINUSCA’s efforts on human rights and the rule of law as a priority task, there are 
still rampant abuses in the CAR. In one reporting period from 15 November 2017 to 15 February 2018, 
MINUSCA documented 1,283 abuses and violations of human rights and humanitarian law.67 The 
violations included attacks against schools, conflict-related sexual violence, killings, and cruel and 
inhuman treatment.68 The number of incidents documented represented an increase of 59% from the 
previous reporting period.  
The work of MINUSCA on human rights and extending the rule of law forms a crucial part of 
its understanding of stabilization. The mission has taken up the mantle of revitalising the justice system 
in the wake of widespread human rights abuses and sexual violence perpetrated throughout the conflict. 
The temporary measures mentioned above are used without establishing precedent.69 However, if the 
                                                 
58 UN, S/PRST/2014/28 (2014), p.4; UN, S/PV.7246 (2014), p.3 as per Mr. Gaye; UN, S/2014/928 (2014), para 
63. 
59 UN, S/PV.7901 (2017), 11 as per Mr. Iliichev.  
60 Human Rights Watch, “Central African Republic: Parliament Adopts Special Criminal Court Rule.” 
61 UN, S/2019/498 (2019), para 59. 
62 UN, S/2019/822 (2019), para 57. 
63 Contrast UN, S/RES/2448 (2018), paras 39(e)(v)-(xi) with UN, S/RES/2499 (2019), paras 32(e)(iv)-(v). 
64 UN, S/2015/227 (2015), para 47. 
65 UN, S/2017/94 (2017), para 48. 
66 UN, S/RES/2212 (2015). 
67 UN, S/2018/125 (2018), para 51. 
68 ibid. 
69 UN, S/RES/2149 (2014), para 40; UN, S/RES/2301 (2016), para 34(d)(i). 
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Court is successful the use of similar arrangements in future mandates could prove desirable. What is 
concerning is whether other aspects of stabilization will undermine building the rule of law. From a 
human security standpoint basing the mission’s responses on established principles of human rights and 
the rule of law is of crucial importance to provide a solid foundation for the rebuilding of the CAR’s 
institutions. Although, these actions must be undertaken in concert with local people and with local 
concerns being addressed if there is to be faith restored in the system. 
 
3.2 Vital core 
 
The UN understands that in its early stages a peace operation must address urgent priorities and provide 
immediate dividends to the population.70 For a human security approach those priorities and dividends 
must reflect the needs identified by the communities in question. The Secretary-General states, “[t]he 
work of the United Nations in the Central African Republic must be based on a clear understanding of 
the current situation and be tailored to the future needs of its people.”71 It is therefore crucial that the 
UN’s knowledge of the current situation is informed by local people. However, no detail is given on 
whether a particular priority task has been constructed directly from consultations with civil society, 
international partners, or the host state. What can be seen in the documentation is that both MINUSCA 
and representatives of the Security Council do discuss mission matters with a broad range of actors. For 
instance, during a strategic review of the mission the UN met with the government, civil society and 
women’s groups to discuss the mission priorities.72 In March 2015, a Security Council mission to the 
CAR spoke to local authorities, magistrates, the police and gendarmerie, civil society, religious leaders, 
and ex-Séléka representatives.73 These opportunities give space for representatives to raise locally 
informed issues with the international community which may influence the decision-making of the 
Secretariat and the Security Council when formulating the mission mandate.  
 An opportunity for the vital core to be identified at the national level was at the Bangui National 
Forum in May 2015. The Forum aimed to provide space for national reconciliation and allow for 
discussion on the peace process with a wide range of participants.74 Over 600 representatives attended 
representing the government, political parties, civil society, the media, and religious organisations. 
MINUSCA held a workshop to prepare for the Forum for national stakeholders and international 
partners and MINUSCA supported local consultations to collect the views of a wide range of people in 
advance of the forum, an effort welcomed by the Security Council.75 The support MINUSCA provided 
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to hold a large national forum on the peace process allowed for the Central African people to be directly 
included in national reconciliation and consequently, to be empowered. President Touadera reported to 
the Security Council that “the Bangui Forum accorded significant attention to the issue of victims, who 
were able to share their views and their expectations.”76 However, Lombard and Picco have highlighted 
that the Forum had little mention of activities and initiatives at the local level and instead focused on 
national responses for achieving justice for victims such as the Special Criminal Court.77 Unfortunately, 
no follow-up national forums have been held to address the gap of discussing local issues which 
hampers the ability of people to be able to speak about concerns most relevant to them and their 
communities. Importantly, the UN has since recognised the importance of understanding local 
perceptions with the Secretary-General making specific recommendations that would aim to make sure 
the UN “take[s] into account the views and needs of Central Africans.”78 
 Recently in Bangui, tensions escalated in a predominantly Muslim neighbourhood, the PK5, 
and the community requested the government and MINUSCA to step in.79 MINUSCA and the CAR 
armed forces (FACA) arrested and disarmed criminal groups in the neighbourhood, seized weapons, 
ammunition, and narcotics.80 An operation such as this is a prime example of the UN forces responding 
to a direct security threat communicated from the local level. Community liaison assistants (CLAs) are 
also in use by MINUSCA to identify security threats. The assistants are ‘critical links’ between the 
mission and communities in remote areas.81 CLAs are recruited to help the missions gain public support 
for the mandate, they speak the local language, can find out the risks to communities, act at mediators, 
and communicate outcomes to both civilian and military contingents of an operation.82 CLAs are able 
to work with communities to formulate protection strategies and alert mechanisms for community 
security.83 However, it should be noted that CLAs may lead to a particular community feeling 
underrepresented where the CLA is from a different ethnicity or where a community feels the CLA, as 
a local employee of the UN, is using their UN role to spy on them.84 The direct involvement of 
MINUSCA with communities allows for the people affected to raise the issues most relevant to them 
which is necessary for the realisation of human security’s principles. A bottom-up approach is important 
to make the peace process as locally owned as possible. 
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The specifics of vulnerability are given little attention in the reports and meetings held on MINUSCA. 
The most notable identification of vulnerability is with regards to women and children. In Security 
Council meetings it is mentioned a number of times that women and children form the most vulnerable 
segments of the population and are ‘particularly vulnerable’.85 The reason for this is largely because of 
widespread sexual violence against women and the use of child soldiers by armed groups in the CAR.86 
Attention being given to women and children in armed conflict is not uncommon with the Security 
Council establishing a Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict in 2005 and an Informal Expert 
Group on Women, Peace and Security in 2016.87  
 Despite mentioning the vulnerability of women and children in the CAR the Security Council 
does not discuss building resilience of those vulnerable groups in its meetings. It can be read into a 
number of MINUSCA’s activities that the result would be improved resilience. For instance, 
MINUSCA, alongside the government and UNICEF, facilitated the holding of school exams in various 
prefectures and women have been involved in labour intensive work programmes as part of community 
violence reduction programmes.88 In addition, women have routinely been empowered to participate in 
the peace process which consequently allows for the building of resilience. Nevertheless, an express 
concern for building the resilience of vulnerable groups is absent from the UN’s reporting on 
MINUSCA. 
 Other groups have, on occasion, been identified by the Security Council or Secretariat as 
vulnerable.89 Namely, the elderly, disabled, and the Muslim community. The Secretary-General 
reported that the elderly is disproportionately affected by the violence in the CAR but no further details 
are given.90 Likewise, in its first renewal of MINUSCA’s mandate the Security Council expressed 
concern for the situation of persons with disabilities and the need to address their situation in the 
humanitarian response.91 The concern for the disabled was removed from later renewals of the mandate.  
 During the conflict the Muslim community has been targeted by the anti-Balaka in retaliation 
for the actions of the ex-Séléka. Consequently, a large part of the Muslim population has been displaced 
or has left the CAR.92 The UN refers to these communities as vulnerable on a couple of occasions.93 
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However, the planning of the mission’s PoC strategy did not identify Muslims, or Christians for that 
matter, as particularly vulnerable.94 It is likely that the UN has tried to avoid religious issues in its 
response to the CAR to ensure the organisation did not give credence to the claims that the conflict is a 
religious one. Instead the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations claims, “religion is 
not at the heart of the difficulties facing the Central African Republic.”95 It is difficult to assess whether 
express identification as vulnerable would improve the situation of displaced Muslim individuals but 
what is clear is that resilience needs to be built to prevent future displacements. The UN may have to 
recognise that it needs to specifically work with Muslim communities to ensure they are able to have a 
voice in the CAR and withstand future instability without the need to flee. The mission would fail, in 
part, if Muslim individuals were unable to return to their homes or in the future were forced to flee once 
again in the absence of UN forces.  
 
3.4 Protection  
 
MINUSCA was mandated from the start with a clear protection of civilians mandate.96 The mandate 
includes protecting the population from physical violence, through robust force, active patrolling, and 
the use of Children Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors.97 The purpose is to deter and 
restrict the activities of armed groups in cooperation with the French Operation Sangaris force.98 
MINUSCA has been faced with a high level of violence throughout its deployment and in 2015 the 
protection of civilians “remained the highest priority task for MINUSCA.”99 
The first key area for protection is the so-called ‘robust’ use of force. Since 2016 the mission 
has had a strategic objective to support the creation of conditions that will reduce the presence and 
threat of armed groups through a “proactive and robust posture without prejudice to the basic principles 
of peacekeeping.”100 The use of robust force is intended to provide for the restoration of state authorities 
and provision of basic services.101 Interestingly, the UN Independent Expert on the situation of human 
rights in the Central African Republic, Marie-Thérèse Keita Bocoum, called for a strategy on the 
‘neutralisation’ of armed groups in the CAR.102 Thus far, the neutralisation of armed groups has not 
been included in MINUSCA’s mandate to denote peace enforcement action similar to that taken by the 
Force Intervention Brigade deployed as part of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). 
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In February 2017 Operation Bekpa sought to stabilise the town of Bambari by securing the 
agreement that the armed groups would leave. MINUSCA used armed helicopters to engage armed 
groups attempting to re-enter the town.103 Lieutenant General Keïta reported to the Security Council 
that the “operation succeeded because we bent various administrative rules, challenged some limiting 
agreements with troops and changed morale where the use of force was involved.”104 The robust posture 
of MINUSCA forces is perceived to be preventative and avert ‘major armed confrontations’ and 
improve security.105 For instance, MINUSCA undertook robust operations to ‘expel’ the Front 
démocratique group from roads between Baboua and Beloko.106 More recently, the aforementioned 
‘joint disarmament and arrest operation’ in Bangui’s PK5 neighbourhood, launched alongside FACA 
resulted in armed raids which led to exchanges of fire and the death of a peacekeeper.107 An operation 
that includes armed raids to stop the activities of criminal gangs is an example of an action that supports 
the extension of state authority and toes the fine line between a ‘robust posture’ and taking the initiative 
in enforcement activity.108 In 2019 it was reported that violence between FACA and the Union pour la 
paix en Centrafrique ‘prompted’ MINUSCA to launch a robust operation to protect civilians that 
involved MINUSCA seizing and dismantling bases of the armed group.109 
Under the analytical framework, protection means upholding rights and freedoms, taking 
preventive not reactive steps, and identifying gaps in protection. The UN consistently attempts to create 
a protective environment under its protection of civilian strategies where a robust posture is used to 
deter violence against civilians. To be in line with human security this must mean creating a protective 
environment which prevents violence against civilians and not one that necessitates UN intervention 
after the fact. 
Recently, MINUSCA has been supporting the redeployment of FACA. Following the desertion 
of a large number of CAR troops the Transitional Authorities sought assistance with rebuilding its 
military capabilities. The EU deployed a training mission (EUTM RCA) in 2016 to assist with defence 
sector reform and has trained almost 3000 FACA soldiers who are now being redeployed to work 
alongside international forces.110 The UN stresses the members of FACA need “clean criminal and 
human rights records.”111 However, given the history of abuses by FACA it is paramount that 
communities trust the forces will not commit further human rights violations.112 MINUSCA has carried 
out joint patrols with FACA and supported their redeployment to Obo and Paoua on an ad hoc and 
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temporary basis.113 In the interim, while FACA regains the trust of the CAR people, the UN forces risk 
damaging their relationship with communities once the UN begins to cooperate more frequently with 
FACA forces. One way to mitigate the risk of marginalisation is by ensuring the mandate is clearly 
disseminated to the population and it is explained that, in the case of MINUSCA, the EU-trained FACA 
soldiers must comply with the HRDDP. Karlsrud says the emphasis on the HRDDP shows there are 
“lingering concerns” about close cooperation with other actors.114 The UN further needs to remain 
committed to the HRDDP to ensure the forces it works with under a stabilization mandate are not a risk 
to the reputation of the UN’s blue helmets. 
 The second key area of protection that is important for human security is preventing sexual 
violence and abuse against women and children.115 For the first time UN-Women and UNDPKO 
provided specialized pre-deployment training to MINUSCA on preventing sexual violence.116 The 
statistics on sexual violence in the CAR are staggering with an estimated 44.5% of the population 
suffering from sexual and gender-based violence in 2014.117 To prepare for this reality MINUSCA ran 
around 70 training sessions on sexual violence, launched an evaluation of centres for victims of sexual 
violence, and supported the Government in developing a strategy for investigating sexual violence.118 
MINUSCA’s work on sexual violence, with the assistance of Women Protection Advisors, are directly 
tied to the rule of law efforts and ending impunity. MINUSCA has been seeking the prosecution of 
gender and sexual violence-based cases alongside both preventing future cases and giving support for 
victims.119 
 However, gender and sexual based violence cannot be discussed without acknowledging that 
MINUSCA and other international forces have been responsible for various instances of sexual abuse. 
At first the UN was slow to respond to the allegations against its peacekeepers leading to an External 
Independent Panel to review the allegations.120 The General Assembly adopted a resolution approving 
a zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, but allegations continued against MINUSCA 
personnel with new reports of abuse throughout 2017.121 The MINUSCA mandate was renewed in 2017 
to include stronger provisions for the prevention of sexual abuse.122 The Security Council stipulates that 
all personnel will be vetted for sexual misconduct and troop contributing countries should provide pre-
deployment awareness training ensure ‘full accountability’ for their personnel.123  
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During the planning stages it was understood that the crisis affecting the country could not be resolved 
without dialogue between a broad spectrum of Central Africans.124 MINUSCA has attempted to 
facilitate this by empowering women to have an active role in an inclusive peace process. In its first 
mandate, MINUSCA was instructed to facilitate and provide technical assistance to the electoral 
process ensuring “full and effective participation of women at all levels and at an early stage”.125 The 
mandates also recognise gender as a cross-cutting issue and that the mission will assist the government 
in making sure women are represented in all spheres and at all levels.126 The Executive Director of UN-
Women reported to the Security Council that “[e]mpowered women are the best drivers of growth, the 
best hope of reconciliation and the best buffer against the radicalization of youth and the repetition of 
cycles of violence.”127 UN-Women assisted MINUSCA in promoting women’s participation and 
leadership for local reconciliation, national dialogues, and transitional justice.128 Women’s participation 
is key for demanding improvements in the system of protection which caters for women in particular 
and their specific vulnerabilities. Allowing space for women to use their voices will allow for better 
identification of how security issues are affecting communities and how the international community 
can respond. 
 MINUSCA has specifically advocated for women to play a bigger role in national politics. The 
mission pushed for a minimum of 30% representation of women in the national consultation process.129 
There is not, however, a legal quota for female candidates in elections.130 The 2016 elections saw only 
one woman elected in the first round of voting and five in the second, out of 131 seats, representing just 
4.5% of elected candidates.131 Furthermore, a large number of women voted but since the end of the 
transitional government, where there was a female head of state, there has been a “reassertion of the 
prevailing norms of gender inequality in society into the democratic process”.132 Women in the CAR 
also have limited financial resources for political campaigns and a low literacy rate.133 The Security 
Council does continue to reiterate the need for the participation of women in the peace process and 
participation in inclusive dialogues for political agreement but more work is needed to ensure women 
are given the resources to have effective participation.134 
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 Since 2016, MINUSCA has worked towards national reconciliation through “an inclusive 
process that involves men and women of all social, economic, political, religious and ethnic 
backgrounds, including, those displaced by the crisis”.135 MINUSCA had previously, in 2015, 
established local peace and reconciliation committees in cooperation with UNDP but from 2017 the 
committees formed part of the President’s peace infrastructure.136 The committees are elected by the 
communities and “are expected to solve local conflicts and promote peace through mediation and 
dialogue.”137 Furthermore the committees “offer agency to women, members of civil society, religious 
leaders and young people.”138 This is remarkably similar to the human security aim of giving people 
the ability to act on their own behalf and on the behalf of others.139 Examples of local peace committee 
activities include community awareness campaigns, reopening of markets, and facilitating dialogue 
between farmers and herders to resolve differences without the influence of armed groups.140 In 2019 
the Secretary-General reported that a local committee created following a peace agreement in 
Bangassou had been working on providing conditions for the safe return of Muslims who fled in 
2017.141 By creating and supporting local peace and reconciliation committees the mission is preparing 
for when it will no longer be present and communities will need to resolve differences without conflict. 
Supporting the committees is an example of how MINUSCA aims to strengthen the capacity of 
individuals and communities to resolve conflicts. Having the capacity to mitigate the impact of 
insecurities and make better choices is a core aspect of empowerment that is being operationalised by 
MINUSCA.  
 
4 Peacebuilding at the local level and the threat posed by militarisation 
 
Two aspects of MINUSCA’s stabilization mandate appear to be at loggerheads following the above 
study of the mission. On the one hand, the UN can be seen to pursue inclusive peace processes as part 
of their peacebuilding agenda with local engagement as a priority. There appears to be an implicit 
understanding in the mission that the peace process needs to involve some level of bottom-up 
empowerment to allow individuals to ‘make better choices’ and avoid conflict in the future. On the 
other hand, the mission is a highly militarised endeavour with a robust mandate which includes 
cooperation with FACA and the use of ‘robust’ force in pursuit of stability. 
The UN has not always sought to involve the local in peacebuilding efforts. Instead there was 
previously an understanding that liberal peacebuilding from the top would trickle down to peace at the 
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local level. For instance, in the DRC in the early to mid-2000s peacebuilding was focused on the peace 
process and elections at the national level.142 However, top-down approaches have been described as 
“inherently hegemonic and out-of-touch with local realities” and studies have shown that success at the 
national level does not necessarily mean there will be equal success at the local level.143 Instead, top-
down approaches can miss the nuances of a conflict, worsen conditions, and marginalise 
communities.144 To avoid this the UN needs to navigate a complex environment ensuring both 
engagement at the local level and wider national reconciliation. This view is reflected by UN policy 
which understands that to achieve effective peacebuilding there must be local ownership and the 
incorporation of local partners into the process.145 Peacebuilding as a whole is intrinsically linked to 
improving human security. For instance, Hanlon and Christie have suggested that without 
peacebuilding efforts to re-establish the police, judicial system and a functioning bureaucracy 
individuals “struggle to regain their security.”146 
A recent study of the other two ongoing stabilization missions, United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and MONUSCO, has 
concluded that stabilization mandates are “antithetical” to the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding and 
strategies to engage the local are undermined by “an overarching militarized and state-centric blueprint 
for stabilization.”147 In a similar vein, the below discussion explains how MINUSCA has a focus on 
two aspects of human security as part of the peacebuilding agenda, namely entrenching the rule of law 
and empowerment of the local, but that militarisation risks undermining these efforts.  
As part of its peacebuilding agenda, the UN has adopted a focus on the rule of law with the 
Secretary-General stating it is “at the very heart of the [UN’s] mission”.148 MINUSCA is an exemplary 
example of this with an unequivocal focus on ending impunity and rebuilding the rule of law. As 
explained above, the concept of human security has argued that protection from insecurity goes beyond 
physical protection and instead human security involves wider objectives. Insecurity can be caused by 
crime, insecurities involving employment, vulnerability, health and illness, and more. Sannerholm 
argues the rule of law is seen as a remedy for wider concerns of insecurity, such as social vulnerabilities, 
health or economic threats, as law governs many aspects of an individual’s life from criminal justice to 
private economic affairs.149 Other reasons for the UN’s focus on the rule of law have been given such 
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as addressing past wrongs and atrocities by providing the host state with a functioning judicial system 
and also the fact the rule of law assists with long-term peacebuilding.150 
By focusing on the rule of law, MINUSCA put’s into action the normative foundations of 
human security providing the framework for other, more ambitious goals. If this strategy is effective 
and holds legitimacy amongst local people the use of similar hybrid solutions, like the Special Criminal 
Court, could be deemed a suitable method of achieving rule of law goals in future mandates. Within the 
CAR, one study has indicated that individuals do believe those responsible for the conflict and crimes 
committed thereafter, should be punished.151 Whereas persons who have merely capitalised on the 
conflict and committed ‘petty’ crimes such as looting are much more varied.152 Ending impunity though 
is difficult where there is little trust in the justice system with people believing trials are “won by the 
disputant who pays the magistrate more or by the one who has a better relationship with him”.153 In the 
same study, interviewees indicated an international body would be needed to provide justice.154 
Providing support and methods of ending impunity is a way in which the UN Security Council 
can link the mission’s peacebuilding activities to wider agendas on international criminal justice and 
universal human rights. A focus on the rule of law and ending impunity could be a positive step for UN 
peace operations where missions can tap into the UN’s rich expertise in the area. However, if the UN 
wishes to continue this strategy the Security Council will need to pay close attention to the outcome of 
the approach taken in the CAR. Local perceptions of justice and ending impunity are vital in shaping 
future approaches that provide visible justice that is trusted by local people. Particularly where host 
state forces are responsible for human rights violations the effectiveness of the UN’s efforts in 
entrenching the rule of law become questionable. The UN must be resolute when it seeks to ensure the 
rule of law applies to all actors involved in a (post)conflict situation. Ending impunity cannot only be 
applied to some of those actors and importantly for a hybrid court heavily supported by the international 
community it cannot be seen to provide only victor’s justice, especially where the UN have designated 
the state as the legitimate authority. The UN will need to balance its express support for building the 
capacity of the host state alongside its work on the rule of law and human rights to ensure the two areas 
are not in conflict and do not prevent the organisation from pursuing human security. 
Empowerment, was visible in a range of MINUSCA’s activities. Women in particular are a 
focus of UN peacebuilding activities with the Secretary-General specifically recognising that the 
participation of women is directly linked to the success of a peace process.155 To protect progress made 
on bottom-up empowerment, the UN needs to be forceful in its push for bottom-up inclusion in national 
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peace processes to ensure the organisation’s positive work at the local level does in fact feed up to peace 
at the national level. MINUSCA’s mandate makes frequent mention of promoting participation of a 
range of local-level actors and the mission assisted with the holding of the Bangui Forum. Progress 
though could be lost where resulting peace negotiations or government reconciliation plans do not 
adequately include local actors. For instance, the Bangui Form led to recommendations that there 
existed a need for the increased participation of citizens and the bridging of the gap between Bangui 
and the rest of the CAR.156 Bottom-up empowerment then would be an ideal method of achieving this 
aspiration. However, progress has been hindered by the government’s failure to disseminate the 
outcomes of the Forum and MINUSCA’s inability to influence the host state in its national level 
negotiations because of the mission’s ‘hands-off’ approach.157 
 To realise the empowerment of the local the host state needs to feed local participation into the 
wider national reconciliation programmes. No matter how much the UN chooses to focus on 
empowerment little can be done without the host state’s support for a bottom-up peace process. 
Similarly, within the UN the empowerment aspects of the mission must feed up into the decision-
making of the Secretariat and Security Council. The mission documents examined above rarely identify 
where a decision has been taken due to local input being acted on by the Security Council. Quick impact 
projects (QIPs) for instance are mentioned as a method of reducing impoverishment, which “is helping 
to fuel armed groups.”158 It is nevertheless unclear to what extent local input, where empowered persons 
identify the vital core, is utilised in determining what QIPs the mission will implement. For example, 
the UN reporting does not elaborate on whether local people in the fourth district of Bangui requested 
the mission to construct a sports and cultural centre for the youth, which forms one such QIP.159 Going 
forward, the UN’s empowerment strategy will need more transparent reporting and would benefit from 
an overarching policy to guide the implementation of a mandate which calls for meaningful engagement 
with local populations. The Security Council in particular will need to provide space for local views to 
be listened to and acted upon for the UN to assist with building a truly bottom-up peace. 
 Militarisation within UN stabilisation missions is a trend which many texts have discussed and 
undoubtedly will expand on in the future. For the purposes of this article it will be outlined how 
militarisation can undermine the UN’s human security-related efforts but that is not to say it is the only 
negative associated with militarisation or indeed that there are no positives.160 What is clear in 
MINUSCA is a preoccupation with robust responses to provide physical protection. MINUSCA has not 
primarily concerned itself with broader facets of human security-based protections such as 
environmental degradation, health threats or economic harm etc. In trying to achieve an absence of 
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physical harm the UN has adopted a highly militarised and robust stance. Pugh has noted how a robust 
posture can lead to a preoccupation with force protection and a fortress culture surrounding UN bases 
as has been seen in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).161 MINUSCA though is different. When 
MINUSCA deployed the host state had little control beyond Bangui and a robust, highly militarised 
posture was needed to deflect armed groups as the host state, with the support of the mission, extended 
state authority beyond the capital.  
 It is true that this drive toward greater militarisation is in part at the request of African states. 
Officials from African states have suggested militarisation is a precondition to being able to provide 
adequate protection during current conflicts.162 To demonstrate the current African appetite for 
peacekeeping, at the beginning of the 2000s African countries provided 27% of peacekeeping troops 
but today that number stands at 49% globally and 58% of the UN troops operating in Africa.163 Bode 
and Kalsrud have argued that greater African participation has meant a greater willingness to use 
force.164 Increasingly, major TCCs to missions are neighbouring states, regional partners or African 
Union members who will have a number of vested interests in quelling a conflict swiftly. Reasons such 
as curtailing refugees in the region or preventing the disruption to trade give nearby states, rightly or 
wrongly, reason to militarily involve themselves through a UN mission. 
 A key risk of increased militarisation is if missions such as MINUSCA proactively use force 
they risk intensifying violence and becoming a party to the conflict under international humanitarian 
law.165 The UN traditionally remains impartial and does not take sides in a conflict. However, with 
MINUSCA providing support to FACA and conducting joint operations there is the risk that the 
peacekeepers could lose their protections and be deemed combatants where increasing levels of force 
are used against armed groups.166 Another consequence of this is the potential for civilians to be harmed 
by an intensified conflict. If the UN engage armed groups on a more frequent basis there is the 
possibility of civilians being harmed as collateral damage. The use of robust force would then be 
counterproductive and undermine one of the core tenets of peacekeeping, the protection of civilians. 
The UN must balance the need to adopt a robust posture when countering well-armed, organised groups 
that pose a serious threat with the intensification of the conflict in mind. 
 On the point of impartiality, Laurence states, “UN peacekeepers can take forceful action and 
still be ‘impartial’ as long as they are advancing ostensibly universal goals, like promoting human 
rights.”167 This may be the case where the UN is using force against spoilers in the protection of 
civilians. However, where the UN is seen to be training and operating alongside host state forces 
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impartiality becomes a thinly veiled perception. Longobardo has similarly argued robust missions are 
not impartial due to their active role in fighting armed groups.168 There is a delicate balance to be struck 
between militarisation alongside the host state on the one hand and inclusive peacebuilding processes 
on the other. The UN risks undermining its bottom-up empowerment work with communities to identify 
the vital core and security needs where militarisation leads to robust force being used in a partial 
manner. MINUSCA is mandated to support national reconciliation but where the mission is seen to be 
fighting an enemy alongside FACA there may be ethnic, religious, or other divisions, between 
communities that lead to the UN no longer being a trusted, impartial partner. Similarly, where conflict 
is intensified there is a risk that benefits of existing peacebuilding work may be lost. 
 To conclude this discussion on a slightly positive note, the UN’s militarised protection strategy 
is framed by the organisation as preventative and preventative protection is the emphasis of human 
security. For instance, proactive patrolling conducted by MINUSCA is seen to be preventative to 
demonstrate to armed groups that the peacekeepers can and will deter violence. On a deeper level, with 
regards to sexual violence the UN has trained both its own and host state personnel in how to prevent 
sexual violence, and developed national policies with the government on preventative measures. 
However, a robust protection strategy is flawed in the sense that it addresses a narrow, militaristic notion 
of security. Robust patrols of heavily armed forces working in concert with newly-trained host state 
forces will be able to prevent some instances of sexual violence and deter armed groups but they cannot, 




By applying an analytical framework of human security this study has shown that MINUSCA has a 
clear focus on extending the authority of the state beyond Bangui, in particular with regard to the 
extension of the rule of law and rebuilding the justice system. MINUSCA has also supported a number 
of community-based initiatives both for consultation purposes and for empowering local communities 
to resolve their own security issues. The UN, on some occasions, facilitates dialogue with civil society 
and local communities, but it is unclear to what extent the dialogue influences mission choices when 
approving projects and, at a higher level, the mission priorities as defined by the Security Council. 
MINUSCA has become known for its use of robust force and has recently begun cooperating with 
FACA, which could have serious consequences. The fact this study has relied solely upon UN 
documentation, mainly Secretary-General reports and Security Council meeting records, leaves open 
questions about whether there is any disparity between what is reported and what is occurring in the 
field. Particularly in relation to how field activities are fed up into the reports and framed by UN 
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officials. Future research could delve into this further and seek to uncover whether the way mission 
activities are framed is in fact a true representation of the work at mission-level. 
 Nevertheless, the reporting shows that competing interests in the mission mandate risk 
undermining each other where militarisation and cooperating with the host state forces have adverse 
effects on the UN’s ability to build peace at the local level, empower communities, and support national 
reconciliation. The UN will need to carefully consider how it wishes to proceed in future stabilization 
mandates to avoid a situation where engaging in war-fighting against spoilers or working closely 
alongside the state frustrates efforts to build an inclusive peace and build the capacity of communities.  
More work is needed to investigate the effects of each aspect of stabilization mandates. To name just 
one example, where force is used to displace armed groups there may be a risk of marginalisation in 
communities because of cooperation with host state forces which in turn undermines other 
peacebuilding activities. Lastly, the application of a human security lens is useful as a cognitive exercise 
to draw out aspects of the UN’s approach which are not conducive to the input of individuals affected 
by a peace operation. The analytical framework could be used in other areas of research to assess 
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